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INTRODUCTION
A comparison of the United States and South Africa is instructive
in understanding how complicit behavior perpetuates institutional
racism. In both the United States and South Africa, police and
prosecutors have often faced accusations of racially biased decisionmaking. Racial bias is not a new concept; it is derived from political
systems that separated people based on race. 1 In the United States, the
system is commonly known as segregation; in South Africa, the system
is known as apartheid. Significantly, in both countries, the racial

1. See generally MARTIN N. MARGER, RACE AND ETHNIC RELATIONS:
AMERICAN AND GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES (10th ed. 2015).
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separation was institutionalized and enforced by governmental agents,
particularly police and prosecutors.
However, there are notable differences between the two countries’
accountability systems for policing that reveal a deeper understanding
of the causes of institutional racism than would be possible when
examining each country separately. One lesson revealed is the
importance of understanding the impact of race through the
intersectional lens of each country’s patriarchal system and culture.
Additionally, the differences in the countries’ structures and functions
of accountability systems for policing are instructive because of the
similarities in the countries’ histories.
This Article is a culmination of research and interviews personally
conducted by the author in South Africa. Many of the understandings
regarding the structures and function of policing accountability in South
Africa are directly based off the interviews conducted. The Article will
begin with an overview of political inequality and three methods that
can be used to understand a citizen’s ability to exercise political power.
Section II discusses the structural barriers created by using criminal
prosecutions as a solution for police violence. Section III examines the
barriers to civil lawsuits as a means for accountability against police
violence. Section IV analyzes the policing culture of impunity, and how
it has acted as a barrier to self-regulation and internal accountability.
Finally, Section V proposes lessons on how to improve accountability
for police violence in the future.
I. POLITICAL INEQUALITY AND CITIZENS’ ABILITY
TO DEMAND CHANGE
There are three measures of political inequality that can be used to
understand how members of the public exercise political power: voice,
representation, and influence. 2 Political power, in the context of
accountability for police violence, informs the public’s ability to hold
police officers and prosecutors responsible for their decisions. For
example, both the United States and South Africa’s Constitutions
provide universal suffrage and the right to protest—so voice is
2. John Gaventa & Carin Runciman, Untangling Economic and Political
Inequality: the Case of South Africa, in ISSC ET AL., WORLD SOCIAL SCIENCE REPORT
2016, CHALLENGING INEQUALITIES: PATHWAYS TO A JUST WORLD 70, 70–71
(UNESCO pub., 2016).
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available. However, as a practical matter, there are inherent systemic
limitations in both countries that create political inequality.
A. Voice
In the United States, many police chiefs and prosecutors are
publicly elected. 3 However, voting rights have been eroded through
gerrymandering, voter identification laws, and limitations to sections of
the Voting Rights Act that were designed to limit discriminatory voting
rights restrictions. 4 Furthermore, there are six million convicted felons
in the United States that are unable to vote. 5 Accordingly, many United
States citizens have restricted or limited ability to effect change and
correct inequality through the voting process.
Unlike the United States, in South Africa, citizens do not vote for
police chiefs or prosecutors. 6 Instead, all of these positions are either
appointed (many by the President) or obtained through civil service. 7
Willie Hofmeyr, a member of the Constitutional Assembly and co-chair
of the committee dealing with the judiciary and the legal system, 8
stated, “A lot of us went in [to drafting the Constitution] starry-eyed”
and in retrospect, the Constitutional Assembly should have realized that
“not every President was going to be Mandela.” 9 As a result of this

3. Scott M. Matheson, The Prosecutor, The Press, and Free Speech, 38
FORDHAM L. REV. 865, 879 (1990).
4. ARI BERMAN, GIVE US THE BALLOT (2016). See also Amita Kelly, Does it
Matter that 95% of Elected Prosecutors are White?, NPR (July 8, 2015, 4:59 PM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/itsallpolitics/2015/07/08/420913118/does-it-matterthat-95-of-elected-prosecutors-are-white.
5. Christopher Uggen et al., 6 Million Lost Voters: State-Level Estimates of
Felon Disenfranchisement, 2016, THE SENTENCING PROJECT (Oct. 6, 2016),
http://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/6-million-lost-voters-state-levelestimates-felony-disenfranchisement-2016/.
6. Interview with Willie Hofmeyr, Deputy Nat’l Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions,
Nat’l Prosecuting Auth., in Pretoria, S. Afr. (Jan. 12, 2017) [hereinafter Hofmeyr
Interview].
7. Id. See generally Adam Kassner, Diggin’ Deep into Gold Fields: South
Africa’s Unrealized Black Economic Empowerment in the Shadows of Executive
Discretion, 48 CORNNELL INT’L L.J. 667 (2015).
8. William Andrew “Willie” Hofmeyr, SOUTH AFRICA HISTORY ONLINE (Sept.
1, 2011), http://www.sahistory.org.za/people/william-andrew-willie-hofmeyr.
9. Hofmeyr Interview, supra note 6.
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truth, Hofmeyr believes that having the president appoint such a large
amount of law enforcement positions with little oversight was not the
best idea. 10 Hofmeyr now believes that law enforcement positions
should be appointed in ways more similar to other officials, such as the
Public Protector or the head of the South African Human Rights
Commission.11 Both of these positions require a confirmation process
of 60% parliamentary approval, preceded by a public interview process
to ensure adequate opportunity for public scrutiny and voice. 12
B. Representation
In the United States, prosecutors are vested with the ability to
potentially hold police officers accountable. 13 However, prosecutors
are publicly elected, and elected prosecutors do not reflect the
demographics of the American public. 14 White Americans make up
95% of elected prosecutors and women make up 17% of elected
prosecutors. 15 This racial and gender disparity is exacerbated because
legislators who write the laws that create systems of accountability for
police are also largely unrepresentative of public demographics. 16 This
disparity is demonstrated in the chart below: 17

10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Prosecution of Violation of Certain Law, 42 U.S.C. § 1987 (Westlaw
through Pub. Law. No. 115-90). See generally John V. Jacobi, Prosecuting Police
Misconduct, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 789, 803–11 (2000).
14. See Jamiles Lartey, White Men Make up 79% of Elected Prosecutors in US,
GUARDIAN
(July
7,
2015,
5:32
PM),
Study
Says,
THE
https://www.theguardian.com/law/2015/jul/07/us-elected-prosecutors-white-mencriminal-justice-system.
15. Id.
16. Reid Wilson, In the States: Breaking Down Legislative Demographics,
CONSULT
(Dec.
11,
2015,
12:48
PM),
MORNING
https://morningconsult.com/2015/12/11/in-the-states-breaking-down-legislativedemographics/.
17. Id.
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In South Africa, there are active efforts to broaden the recruitment
of prosecutors, as part of general legal affirmative action requirements,
so that prosecutors are more representative of the racial and gender
composition in South Africa. 18 In the United States, prosecutors are
trained lawyers; therefore, one apparent barrier to establishing a
representative pipeline among prosecutors is the continued racial
disparities in educational attainment. 19
Further comparing each country’s federal legislatures, the South
African National Assembly has greater gender equality than the United
States Congress. In 2015, 40% of the National Assembly’s members

18.
19.

Hofmeyr Interview, supra note 6.
MARGER, supra note 1, at 202–04. See generally JONATHAN KOZOL,
SAVAGE INEQUALITIES: CHILDREN IN AMERICA’S SCHOOLS (2012); Ronald
Brownstein, The Challenge of Educational Inequality, THE ATLANTIC (May 19,
2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2016/05/education-inequalitytakes-center-stage/483405/; Am. Psychol. Ass’n, Ethnic and Racial Disparities in
Education (Aug. 3, 2012), https://www.apa.org/ed/resources/racial-disparities.pdf.
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were women, 20 whereas only 24% of United States’ legislators were
women. 21 One possible reason for this is the African National Congress
(“ANC”), the current majority in South Africa, adopted a 50%
voluntary gender quota system in parliament. 22
Still, in South Africa, heterosexism and patriarchy continue to be
part of the culture with patriarchy cutting across race and class. 23 As a
result, “ambitious women climb the ladder of patriarchy,” and those
who try to speak up against it “pay a higher price politically” than those
who might disagree on policy issues. 24 Thus, more representation does
not necessarily yield equitable outcomes as cultural forces persist. It is
important to understand the disparities in representation through the
lens of both race and gender to gain a greater understanding of the
power structures within these institutions.
C. Influence
In both countries, the most significant disparities exist within the
realm of relative influence and power. Three factors limit an
individual’s ability to exert influence over the political system: money,
optimism about agency, and narratives perpetuated by the press. Each
of these factors impact an individual’s ability to effect change within
the government that would allow for greater accountability of police
violence.
1. Money as Influence
In the United States, Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n,
a recent United States Supreme Court decision, opened the floodgates
that previously protected the political system from corporate money.25
One study estimated 26% of the 2016 presidential election spending
20. Hofmeyr Interview, supra note 6; SADC GENDER PROTOCOL 2017
BAROMETER 74 (Collen Morna et al., eds., 2017); South Africa, QUOTA PROJECT (Feb.
4, 2015), http://www.quotaproject.org/country/south-africa.
21. See generally Wilson, supra note 16.
22. See Constitution of the African National Congress, Rule 6 (Nov. 2007).
23. Interview with Gail Smith, Head of Advocacy and Comm., S. Afr. Hum.
Rts. Comm’n, in Johannesburg, S. Afr. (Jan. 11, 2017) [hereinafter Smith Interview].
24. Id.
25. Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
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was possible as a result of Citizens United. 26 Thus, those with access
to corporate money possess an outsized influence on the election of
decision makers who serve to protect individual rights and develop
systems of accountability.
In South Africa, working for the government (in both elected and
civil servant positions) is often the only means of upward social
mobility. 27 Accordingly, individuals are more likely to take and
perform those jobs in accordance with their own self-interest, rather
than out of a calling to public service. 28 Corruption within this system
is amplified by a middle class that seeks upward mobility, but remains
deeply divided by race. 29 This ultimately results in a group of people
who are unable to consolidate enough political power to change the
system. 30 Consequently, many South Africans are left “fighting over
crumbs the economic elite are willing to give.” 31 The patriarchal
culture provides further “scaffolding of corruption” because much of
the corruption in South Africa is done in accordance with the familial
relationships of men. 32
While the corruption of the political process by wealth in South
Africa is more direct than the United States, both countries must deal
with the political inequality of those with money or power having an
outsized influence.

26. Adam Lioz et al., Court Cash: 2016 Election Money Resulting Directly
(Mar.
14,
2017),
From
Supreme
Court
Rulings,
DEMOS
http://www.demos.org/publication/court-cash-2016-election-money-resultingdirectly-supreme-court-rulings.
27. Interview with Steven Friedman, Res. Professor, U. of Johannesburg, in
Johannesburg, S. Afr. (Jan. 11, 2017) [hereinafter Friedman Interview].
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Smith Interview, supra note 23; see also IBP, US-SOUTH AFRICA ECONOMIC
POLITICAL COOPERATION HANDBOOK: STRATEGIC INFORMATION,
AND
DEVELOPMENTS, CONTACTS 57 (2003); Barbara Oomen, Group Rights in PostApartheid South Africa: The Case of Traditional Leaders, 44 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 73,
88 (1999).
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2. Optimism and Belief in Agency
In the United States, Black Americans are almost evenly split on
whether the country will eventually make the changes needed to give
Blacks equal rights to Whites. Forty-two percent believe the country
will eventually make the necessary changes, 43% do not, and 8% argue
the country has already made such changes. 33 On the other hand, White
Americans are much more optimistic about the current state of equality
with 38% believing the necessary changes have been made, 40%
believing the changes will be made, and only 11% believing that they
will not be made. 34 These numbers are likely explained by the
differences in each group’s experiences with governmental
interactions. 35 For example, Black Americans are 2.8 times more likely
than White Americans to die as a result of interactions with the
government. 36 Despite the differences in each group’s experiences with
the government, Black American voter participation is only 5% less
than White Americans. 37 Thus, in the United States, despite the lack of
optimism about equal rights and the disparities in police violence, Black
Americans continue to demonstrate comparable belief in their agency
through voting.
In South Africa, democracy and the personal agency that
accompanies it are still nascent. Black South Africans, in particular,
while disappointed, are not surprised to see people in positions of power
exploit and abuse the citizenry. 38 Furthermore, South African people

33. Renee Stepler, 5 Key Takeaways About Views of Race and Inequality in
America, PEW RES. CTR. (June 27, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2016/06/27/key-takeaways-race-and-inequality/.
34. Id.
35. James W. Buehler, Racial/Ethnic Disparities in the Use of Lethal Force by
US Police, 2010-2014, 107 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 295 (2017).
36. Id.
37. Voting Turnout Rates, by Race and Ethnicity, 2014, PEW RES. CTR. (Jan.
19, 2016), http://www.pewhispanic.org/2016/01/19/millennials-make-up-almosthalf-of-latino-eligible-voters-in-2016/ph_election-2016_appen-chart-07/.
38. Interview with Siphiwe Segodi, Project Officer, Freedom of Expression
Inst., in Soweto, S. Afr. (Jan. 7, 2017) [hereinafter Segodi Interview]; see also
Kassner, supra note 7, at 685 (“President Jacob Zuma—himself the subject of 783
counts of corruption that were dropped—has overseen a tumultuous regime that has
faced numerous corruption charges encompassing the abuse of public funds, from
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have a deep loyalty to the African National Congress—the current
majority party and party of the liberation movement. 39 This loyalty,
coupled with a history of an oppressive government, creates a
challenging environment for political alternatives. 40
Thus,
disappointment with economic stagnation is often understood as
disappointment with democracy because “freedom is yielding very
little” for people in regards to material change given “you can’t eat
freedom.” 41 Some members of the liberation movement recognize this
challenge saying, “We didn’t do it for the sake of the organization
[referring to the ANC], we did it for the country.” 42
However, many South Africans are realistic and willing to accept
incremental change. 43 One challenge to realizing material change in
South Africa is that entrepreneurship is not a deeply valued concept.44
Both the liberation movement’s founding communist ideas, such as
governmental allocation of resources, as well as apartheid-era
oppression created a culture that does not support entrepreneurship. 45
As a result, the economic disappointment people feel is exacerbated by
a lack of agency. Therefore, in South Africa, the belief in agency, or
lack thereof, directly influences South Africans’ ability and desire to
utilize the government, which further exacerbates the political
inequality.
3. Narratives Perpetuated by the Press
While both countries have a free press, they deal with issues
regarding media “echo chambers” 46 that present different information

improvement of his rural Nkandla residence to improper awarding of government
contracts.”).
39. Interview with Carin Runciman, Senior Researcher, U. of Johannesburg, in
Johannesburg, S. Afr. (Jan. 10, 2017) [hereinafter Runciman Interview].
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Interview with Robert McBride, Exec. Dir., The Indep. Police Investigative
Directorate, in Pretoria, S. Afr. (Jan. 12, 2017) [hereinafter McBride Interview].
43. Runciman Interview, supra note 39.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See JESSICA CLARK & TRACY VAN SLYKE, BEYOND THE ECHO CHAMBER:
HOW A NETWORKED PROGRESSIVE MEDIA CAN RESHAPE AMERICAN POLITICS (2010).
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and context. In the United States, this was attributed to increasingly
partisan news consumption. 47 Although many Americans’ main news
source is television, “40% of all Americans get their news from online
sources,” including social media such as Facebook and Twitter. 48 The
main problem with new online sources is that many are secondary news
sources with altered or skewed information. 49 Moreover, many U.S.
media outlets continue to show Black Americans in “crime news
narratives,” which have a severe impact on accountability for police
violence against Black Americans. 50
For example, Tamir Rice was a 12-year-old African American with
a fake gun who was shot and killed after police officers were alerted to
a “man” in a nearby park with a “gun.” 51 From the time of Rice’s death
to the shooting officer’s “grand jury, 5,912 media items and broadcast
reports were published on the racially-charged killing.” 52 Significantly,
during a press conference, the prosecutor in charge of the officer’s
indictment stated he felt no need to present certain information to the
grand jury because the jurors could read about it in the newspaper. 53
An “echo chamber” is a term used to describe a situation where information and ideas
are perpetuated and validated by repeated communications within a specific system.
Id.
47. Brendan Nyhan, Relatively Few Americans Live in Partisan Media Bubble,
TIMES
(Sept.
7,
2016),
But
They’re
Influential,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/08/upshot/relatively-few-people-are-partisannews-consumers-but-theyre-influential.html?_r=0.
48. Bryan Adamson, Reconsidering Pre-Indictment Publicity: Racialized
Crime News, Grand Juries and Tamir Rice, ALA. L. REV. 1, 41 (2017); see also Amy
Mitchell et al., The Modern News Consumer: news Attitudes and Practices in the
Digital Era, PEW RES. CTR. (July 7, 2016), http://www.journalism.org/
2016/07/07/the-modern-news-consumer/.
49. See generally CLARK & SLYKE, supra note 46.
50. Adamson, supra note 48, at 4; see also Joseph Torres, Interrupting a White
Racial Narrative: Ruling Gives Communities of Color More Opportunities to Tell Our
(July
14,
2016),
Stories,
FREEPRESS
https://www.freepress.net/blog/2016/07/14/ruling-gives-communities-of-colormore-opportunities; Blavity Team, New Study Finds News Outlets Promote False,
Negative Portrayals of Black Families that Don’t Match Reality, BLAVITY (last
updated Dec. 19, 2017), https://blavity.com/color-change-study-news-outletspromote-false-negative-portrayals-black-families-reality.
51. Adamson, supra note 48, at 2.
52. Id. at 2–3.
53. Id. at 4.
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Thus, in the United States, the media plays a critical role in
accountability for police violence.
In South Africa, Black journalists perceive the press as “still very
[racially] segregated because of ownership of newspapers.” 54 The
South African government runs many of the radio and television
stations, which remain important methods of news consumption. 55 This
also allows the government to control what information is shared. For
example, the South African Broadcasting Corporation 56 censored
reports of protests and decided not to broadcast “violent” protests. 57
However, unlike the United States, South Africa’s Internet connectivity
remains relatively low. 58 According to the Central Intelligence
Agency’s World Factbook, 54% of South Africans are connected to the
Internet. 59 Still, activists in South Africa state the community is using
social media to document these incidents, and when the public does not
take pictures, “we don’t know what happens in the cases.” 60 Thus,
social media and online news sources are beginning to play a larger role
in South Africa as they do in the United States.
Finally, in both countries, the media has played a significant role in
drawing and connecting historic comparisons between policing
practices from the eras of racial separation and present day incidents. 61
54. Interview with Mpikeleni Duma, Journalist, Sowetan Live, in Johannesburg,
S. Afr. (Jan. 4, 2017) [hereinafter Duma Interview].
55. Hofmeyr Interview, supra note 6.
56. See, e.g., South African Broadcasting Corp., http://www.sabc.co.za/sabc/
(last visited Jan. 14, 2018). “The SABC controls all free broadcast television and the
majority of major radio outlets. The SABC was once seen as the Government’s voice,
but it is not in the midst, of a historic reorganization and change of direction. Although
it is still state owned, the SABC maintains its editorial independence from the
Government. SABC news programming offered balanced coverage of the
Government and the leading opposition parties.” South Africa, 22 Ann. Hum. Rts.
Rep. Submitted to Cong. By U.S. Dep’t St. 616, 320 (1997).
57. Interview with Bongani Xezwi, Organizer, Right to Know, in Soweto, S.
Afr. (Jan. 9, 2017) [hereinafter Xezwi Interview].
58. Id.
59. Central Intelligence Agency, Africa: South Africa, WORLD FACTBOOK (last
updated Jan. 11, 2018), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/ resources/theworld-factbook/geos/sf.html.
60. Xezwi interview, supra note 57.
61. Hofmeyr Interview, supra note 6; Charles Blow, Police Violence: American
TIMES
(Sept.
26,
2016),
Epidemic,
American
Consent,
N.Y.
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Thus, the media has the ability to exert influence over the political
process, and those who control or distort it command a disproportionate
amount of political power.
II. STRUCTURAL BARRIERS TO CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS AS A MEANS
OF ACCOUNTABILITY FOR POLICE VIOLENCE
A. United States
In the United States, the broad range of acceptable standards for use
of police force creates the basis for structural barriers to criminal
prosecutions as a means of accountability for police violence. Indeed,
a constitutionally mandated “reasonableness standard” has evolved
through common law and applies nationally for police use of force. 62
However, detailed policies are decided at local and state levels of
government, and each police department mandates and enforces its own
use of force policy. 63 Furthermore, police unions often negotiate due
process protections beyond what is afforded to civilians. For example,
when police misconduct has occurred or been alleged, interviewing the
police officer may be delayed or stagnated based on pre-negotiated
regulations, making these cases even more difficult to investigate. 64
Generally, the local prosecutor’s office has jurisdiction to file
criminal charges, which often results in conflicting incentives because
local prosecutors depend on local police forces to investigate all of their
cases. 65 Federal civil rights claims enforce Constitutional limits on law
enforcement officers’ conduct and are meant to serve as a safeguard

https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/26/opinion/police-violence-american-epidemicamerican-consent.html.
62. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 387 (1989); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1, 20–22 (1968).
63.
See generally Review, USE OF FORCE PROJECT (Sept. 20, 2016),
http://useofforceproject.org/#review.
64.
See generally Review, CHECK THE POLICE (June 29, 2016),
http://www.checkthepolice.org/#review.
65. Radley Balko, Prosecutors’ Union Inadvertently Demonstrates Why Local
Prosecutors Shouldn’t Investigate Police Shootings, WASH. POST (June 23, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2015/06/23/prosecutorsunion-inadvertently-demonstrates-why-local-prosecutors-shouldnt-investigatepolice-shootings/?utm_term=.7cea680a5f9f.
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against these incentive structures. 66 However, even with a motivated
prosecutor, the doctrine of qualified immunity limits criminal
prosecution that holds police officers accountable. 67 Qualified
immunity shields government employees from civil damages liability
so long as their actions could be found to be reasonably consistent with
rights they allegedly violated. 68 Additionally, qualified immunity can
make criminal prosecutions more challenging because one of the
threshold questions is whether the force used was beyond what is
objectively reasonable and consistent with the individual’s
constitutional rights. 69 Therefore, the analysis significantly depends on
how the case law, regarding use of force, is applied in a jurisdiction.
In the United States, there are additional structural issues that
undermine the effectiveness of criminal prosecutions as a means of
accountability for police violence. First, the United States is the only
country in the world that has elected prosecutors. 70 Prosecutors who
are publicly elected may be more concerned with who among their
constituents are likely to vote in the next local elections, and those
constituents’ willingness to prosecute law enforcement. 71 Second, a
prosecutor’s decision to charge or not to charge a police officer is not
subject to any review process within the jurisdiction where it was
decided. 72 Additionally, there is no avenue to challenge prosecutorial
discretion for charging outside a government actor’s jurisdiction. 73
Third, United States’ judges are often former prosecutors; therefore,
66. 18 U.S.C. § 242 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-89).
67. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Westlaw); see also Anderson v. Creighton,
483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987).
68. Creighton, 483 U.S. at 638.
69. Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846–47 (1998). Cf. Sandin v.
Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995) (holding even prisoners have a liberty interest from
serious bodily injury or death).
70. Michael J. Ellis, The Origins of the Elected Prosecutor, 121 YALE L.J. 6,
15, 28 (2012).
71. See Russell M. Gold, “Clientless” Lawyers, 92 WASH. L. REV. 87, 95
(2017). See generally David Alan Sklansky, The Nature and Function of
Prosecutorial Power, 106 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 473 (2016); Kelly Bowden
Gray, Community Prosecution: After Two Decades, Still New Frontiers, 32 J. LEGAL
PROF. 199, 200–02 (2008).
72. Inmates of Attica Corr. Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375, 380 (2d Cir.
1973).
73. See id. at 380–81.
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many deal with the same acculturation issues that current prosecutors
face both as a result of their former role as a prosecutor and their current
one as a neutral arbiter of the law. 74 Finally, even where there may be
a robust prosecution effort, juries are unlikely to convict police
officers. 75 Jurors are unlikely to convict police officers because they
are hesitant to question a police officer’s judgment and are likely to
view police officers as people they would trust in their daily lives. 76
The United States has various barriers to overcome, but some have
recognized the need to create change. In 2015, California Senator
Barbara Boxer and New Jersey Senator Cory Booker submitted the
Police Reporting Information, Data, and Evidence Act of 2015, which
would require every case where an officer kills or causes serious bodily
injury against a civilian to the Department of Justice. 77 Additionally,
the police department would have to report all victims’ demographic
data. 78
B. South Africa
The formal structures in South Africa are much more robust relative
to the United States. First, the Criminal Procedure Act explicitly states
and governs the standard for use of deadly force by police, 79 and the
Constitutional Court has interpreted this standard. 80 Thus, in South
Africa, there is an explicit constitutional standard that governs use of
74. The Editorial Board, The Homogeneous Federal Bench, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
6, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/07/opinion/the-homogeneous-federalbench.html?_r=0.
75. Kimberly Kindy and Kimbriell Kelly, Thousands Dead, Few Prosecuted,
POST
(Apr.
11,
2015),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/
WASH.
investigative/2015/04/11/thousands-dead-fewprosecuted/?utm_term=.a9076bb16152.
76. Id.
77. See Police Reporting Information, Data, and Evidence Act of 2015, S. 1476,
114th Cong. (1st Sess. 2015) [hereinafter PRIDE Act]; David A. Graham, Why Is It
So Hard to Track Police Killings?, THE ATLANTIC (June 3, 2015),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/06/why-is-it-so-hard-to-trackpolice-killings/394772/.
78. PRIDE Act, supra note 77, § 2(B).
79. Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 § 49 (S. Afr.).
80. Okyerebea Ampofo-Anti, Kim Robinson & Stu Woolman, The South
African Police Service, S. AFR. CONST. 23B.3 (2008).
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force, unlike the United States, where there is a series of fact specific
common law cases. 81 Second, national statutory law establishes and
governs the institutions that govern police (South African Police
Service); investigations of the police (Independent Police Investigative
Directorate); prosecutions (National Prosecuting Authority); and
human rights (South Africa Human Rights Commission). 82
Although police officers do belong to unions in South Africa, they
do not have enough collective bargaining power to create procedural
barriers to investigations, such as additional due process rights not
afforded to civilians. 83 This allows for national consistency in training
and accountability practices as well as equal legitimacy among each
institution. Further, there is mandated reporting for individuals who die
in police custody or are killed as a result of police action. 84 This
reporting allows for patterns to be identified and interventions to be
conducted. 85 However, two identified weaknesses are that there is no
auditing process for these reports, and the National Prosecuting
Authority (NPA) does not prosecute violations of the mandatory
reporting statute. 86
Two recent developments have further strengthened South Africa’s
institutional framework. First, McBride’s Constitutional Court case
affirmed and strengthened the independence of the Independent Police
Investigative Directorate (IPID). 87 However, the IPID continues to
recognize the dangers associated with holding systems of power
accountable, with McBride saying, “We might be causalities of the
work, but we’re laying a foundation.” 88 Second, IPID’s leadership
recently made an internal policy change to refer all cases to the NPA
for review regardless of the recommendation about whether or not the
case should be prosecuted, thereby creating a secondary layer of
81. Hofmeyr Interview, supra note 6.
82. Id. See generally South African Police Service Act 68 of 1995 (last updated
Sept. 28, 2012).
83. McBride Interview, supra note 42.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. See News 24, Constitutional court rules in favour of Robert McBride, MAIL
& GUARDIAN (Sept. 6, 2016, 10:48AM), https://mg.co.za/article/2016-09-06breaking-concourt-rules-in-favour-of-robert-mcbride.
88. McBride Interview, supra note 42.
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review. 89 Previously, IPID only sent cases it believed should be
prosecuted by the NPA. 90 Thus, while IPID maintains the investigatory
role in police violence cases, they are no longer providing the NPA with
a limited selection of cases. Additionally, there was legislative
discussion about making appointments confirmable and to create a
removal process in response to concerns about the NPA’s
politicization.91 This would create a system of checks and balances on
law enforcement institutions rather than concentrating that power in
executive appointments.
In South Africa, the barriers for prosecutors holding police officers
accountable are less structural and result more from the way the
structures function. 92 First, in South Africa, when a police officer is
charged with a crime, the Directors of Public Prosecution (DPP) must
be informed, and a more senior prosecutor at the regional level (as
opposed to a local one) may take over the case. 93 However, despite the
increased possibility for conflicts of interest with local prosecutors,
currently, a regional prosecutor is not required to take over the case.94
Second, South African prosecutors usually have that job for the entirety
of their career, which presents concerns about prosecuting officers
attempting to maintain good relationships with police officers, as a
matter of reputation. 95 This conflict could be remedied by creating a
unit that solely focuses on prosecutions of police officers. Similarly, the
head of the NPA can currently reassign prosecutors and, thus, is
susceptible to capture. 96 This issue is not merely hypothetical; in a
89. Interview with Matthews Sesoko, Dir. of Investigations, The Indep. Police
Investigative Directorate, in Pretoria, S. Afr. (Jan. 12, 2017) [hereinafter Sesoko
Interview].
90. Id.
91. Thulani Gqirana, Breytenbach: Decay of SA’s Justice System Must End,
MAIL & GUARDIAN (Jan. 22, 2015, 6:33 AM), https://mg.co.za/article/2015-01-22breytenbach-decay-of-sas-justice-system-must-end.
92. See generally Greg Nicolson, After 59 Deaths Allegedly at the Hands of the
SAPS in Gauteng, No Officer has Faced Justice, THE DAILY MAVERICK (July 18,
2017, 11:40 AM), https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-07-18-after-59deaths-allegedly-at-the-hands-of-saps-in-gauteng-no-officer-has-facedjustice/#.WYOpAdPyuqA.
93. Hofmeyr Interview, supra note 6.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
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recent police corruption case, the head of the NPA assigned prosecutors
who were not skilled enough to undertake those cases. 97 Third, the
investigations of police officers are subject to serious resource
constraints. 98 However, there is speculation that these resource
constraints are intentional in an attempt to limit the IPID’s ability to
investigate corruption. 99 Finally, the accountability mechanism
outlined in the National Prosecuting Authority Act for prosecutors is
still being implemented and does not provide a robust check on
prosecutorial discretion as of yet. 100
C. Cultural and Systemic Barriers to Prosecution as a Means
forAccountability of Police Violence
Although the United States and South Africa experience different
structural barriers for prosecution to be used as a viable tool for
accountability of police violence, the cultural issues are largely similar.
In the United States, the prosecution of criminal laws during the
segregation era that sought to oppress Black Americans were not
entirely eliminated. 101 Instead, laws requiring racial separation
transformed into race-neutral laws with racially disparate impacts
enforced by prosecutors in the form of the war on drugs. 102
In South Africa, every prosecutor kept their job post-apartheid as a
result of the “sunset clauses;” 103 however, there was a voluntary early
retirement program. 104 Thus, in both countries, after the eras of racial
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.; see also National Prosecution Authority Act 32 of 1998 § 28(2)(4) (S.
Afr.) (“The procedure to be followed in conducting an investigation shall be
determined by the Investigating Director at his or her discretion. . . . ”).
101. See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS
INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF BLINDNESS (The New Press ed., 2010); Jasmine B.
Gonzales Rose, Race Inequity Fifty Years Later: Language Rights Under the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 6 ALA. L. REV. 167 (2014); Lawrence Rosenthal, Pragmatism,
Originalism, Race, and the Case Against Terry v. Ohio, 43 TEX. L. REV. 299 (2010).
102. See ALEXANDER, supra note 101.
103. HEIN MARAIS, SOUTH AFRICA: LIMITS TO CHANGE: THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF TRANSITION 220 (U. Capetown Press 2d ed., 2001). These sunset clauses
were created in 1993 to protect incumbent civil servants from retrenchment. Id.
104. Hofmeyr Interview, supra note 6.
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separation, the general culture of prosecutions persisted because the
prosecutors during the segregation era were the same personnel who
trained the next generation of prosecutors. Furthermore, prosecutors in
both countries became acculturated towards a default of trust towards
police officers because their role requires them to trust police in
prosecuting their other cases on a daily basis. 105
In the United States, the majority of Americans have only recently
become aware of critiques about police violence. 106 Similarly, in South
Africa, while there is activism around the way police treat protestors,
there is little focus on the way police interact with alleged criminal
suspects. 107 Some argue the public may be unwilling to criticize
policing practices when crime rates are high, and instead demand
harsher government action, as is currently the case in South Africa. 108
However, disaggregated data, in both countries, demonstrates crime
rates do not correlate or causally relate to levels of police violence. 109
Therefore, this suggests the public disinclination to criticize
government action is largely due to cultural priorities. 110 Additionally,
in the United States, police violence may make communities less
willing to engage with the police, thereby creating a negative cycle of
community violence and further justification for police violence. 111
105. Id.; see also Jacobi, supra note 13, at 803–04 (“[United States] prosecutors
also find themselves in a difficult position when faced with an accusation of police
misconduct. They work closely with police and their ability to succeed in their
everyday tasks of prosecuting routine crimes depends on the work and cooperation of
police officers.”).
106. Avidan Y. Cover, Reconstructing the Right Against Excessive Force, 68
FLA. L. REV. 1773, 1775–77 (2016); Katie Nodjimbadem, The Long, Painful History
of Police Brutality in the U.S., SMITHSONIAN (July 27, 2017),
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smithsonian-institution/long-painful-historypolice-brutality-in-the-us-180964098/.
107. Xezwi Interview, supra note 57.
108. Telephone Interview with Antony Altbeker, Author, The Dirty Work of
Democracy (Jan. 13, 2017) [hereinafter Altbeker Interview].
109. DAVID BRUCE, AN ACCEPTABLE PRICE TO PAY?: THE USE OF LETHAL
FORCE BY POLICE IN SOUTH AFRICA 5–6 (2010); see also Police Violence Map, It’s
Not About Crime, MAPPING POLICE VIOLENCE (last updated Jan. 3, 2018),
https://mappingpoliceviolence.org/ (graph demonstrates the lack of correlation
between crime rate and police violence in the United States).
110. BRUCE, supra note 109, at 5–6.
111. Matthew Desmond et al., Police Violence and Citizen Crime Reporting in
the Black Community, 81 AM. SOC. REV. 857 (2016).
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Likewise, in South Africa, the correlation is closely related to deaths of
police officers because “police always revenge.” 112
Both countries also share systemic issues in the viability of
prosecutors’ offices as a means for accountability for police violence.
For example, in both countries, prosecutors are not responsible for the
agencies conducting the case investigation, but the strength of the case
directly depends on the strength of the investigation. In the United
States, prosecutors are often dependent on the investigation of the same
police departments where the accused officer works. For example, in
the Freddie Gray case in Baltimore, the prosecutor Marilyn Mosby
received very little assistance from the police department in conducting
the investigation. 113
Similarly, in South Africa, the NPA runs into issues of police
networks where police officers try to cover up for each other. 114 IPID
is responsible for investigating criminal activity by the police as well as
all deaths that occur in police custody. 115 Although it is independent
from police services, IPID has been described as “useless” by
organizers because local police conduct the initial crime scene survey
and preservation, during which many basic forensics are compromised
and dockets are lost. 116 Additionally, IPID noted the police are familiar
with the investigatory process, and the majority of cases are those where
police officers are the only witnesses. 117 Issues of familiarity with
process are also true in the United States.
Overall, both countries face different structural barriers when using
prosecutors as a means to hold officers accountable for police violence.
South Africa’s creation of IPID shows one possible solution is to create
an independent group of investigators unconnected to internal police
departments. However, any independent body that will be used as a

112. Segodi Interview, supra note 38.
113. Wil S. Hylton, Baltimore vs. Marilyn Mosby, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/02/magazine/marilyn-mosby-freddie-graybaltimore.html.
114. Hofmeyr Interview, supra note 6.
115. Id.
116. Interview with Dale McKinley, Author, South Africa’s Corporatised
Liberation: A critical analysis of the ANC in power, in Johannesburg, S. Afr. (Jan. 10,
2017) [hereinafter McKinley Interview].
117. Xezwi Interview, supra note 57.
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means for policing accountability needs effective investigatory tools to
actually hold police officers accountable.
III. BARRIERS TO CIVIL SUITS AS A MEANS FOR ACCOUNTABILITY
AGAINST POLICE VIOLENCE
In the United States, individuals can only bring civil rights claims
against local municipalities, including police departments and
prosecutors’ offices, when an injury is inflicted as a result of a
government policy. 118 Otherwise, individuals are limited, if not
completely barred, from suing governmental entities under the doctrine
of sovereign immunity. 119 These types of suits are further complicated
by obscure policies regarding data collection requirements and
limitations on public access to data that make it challenging to identify
a governmental agency’s pattern or practice of bad policy. 120 The
federal government does not mandate all state and local departments to
report deaths in their custody, and the principles of federalism would
make such mandates challenging. 121
On the other hand, in South Africa, civil suits can be brought
against the NPA for failure to bring criminal charges, thereby making
the NPA’s decisions subject to judicial review. 122 Further, the legal
procedure, in such cases, provides plaintiffs with a high level of access
to information during discovery. 123 However, much of the population
face financial barriers when bringing civil suits, and the non-profit
impact litigation sector is still developing. 124 Therefore, in both the
United States and South Africa, civil litigation provides recourse for a
limited subset of individuals who would seek to hold police officers
accountable through civil, rather than criminal, litigation.
118. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978).
119. See id.
120. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 468 (1996).
121. See Juleyka Lantigua-Williams, The Justice Department Corrects for A
ATLANTIC
(Oct.
14,
2016),
Use-of-Force
Blind
Spot,
THE
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/10/justice-department-police-useforce/504050/.
122. Hofmeyr Interview, supra note 6.
123. Id.
124. The non-profit litigation sector not only represents clients, but also seeks
to change the law. Altbeker Interview, supra note 108.
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IV. PAST AS A PROLOGUE: POLICING CULTURE OF IMPUNITY AS A
BARRIER TO SELF-REGULATION AND INTERNAL ACCOUNTABILITY
The concept of path dependency is instructive in understanding
why police departments in both countries continue to demonstrate
similar behaviors to the eras of racial separation and fail to self-regulate
or hold themselves accountable. Path dependency is the theory that an
organization or institution’s history greatly informs its present state.125
Path dependency occurs for three possible reasons: (1) historical
experiences shape mutually consistent expectations; (2) informational
channels or codes and durable physical goods allow an organization to
operate efficiently; and (3) the strong interrelatedness among the
constituent elements of complex organizations. 126 In modern parlance,
these three concepts could be defined as: (1) institutional values or
culture, (2) patterns of behaviors and continued tools, and (3) social
networks and relationships.
A. Institutional Values and Culture
Both the United States and South Africa practice unique and strong
policing cultures. Often, that culture includes an element of impunity.
In the United States, law students participating in the Civil Rights and
Restorative Justice Project are investigating murders of African
Americans during an era of racial terror from 1930 to 1970. 127 Before
these law students’ efforts, many of these murders were never
investigated by police, let alone tried in a court of law. 128 Presently,

125.
INSTITUTIONAL
DEPENDENCY AND SOCIETAL

REFORMS AND PEACEBUILDING: CHANGE, PATHDIVISIONS IN POST-WAR COMMUNIITIES 91 (Nadine
Ansor & Sabine Kurtenbach eds., 2016); Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the
Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA
L. REV. 601 (2001); Paul A. David, Why are Institutions the ‘Carriers of History’?
Path Dependence and the Evolution of Conventions, Organizations and Institutions,
5 STRUCTURAL & ECON. DYNAMICS 2 205, 207 (1994).
126. David, supra note 125, at 209.
127. Beth Schwartzapfel, Getting Away with Murder, THE MARSHALL PROJECT
(Jan. 3, 2017, 10:00 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2017/01/03/ gettingaway-withmurder?utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=newsletter&utm_
source=opening-statement&utm_term=newsletter-20170104-665#.nq2Ud83Fr.
128. Id.
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72% of U.S. police officers disagree with the statement, “[O]fficers
who consistently do a poor job are held accountable.” 129
In South Africa, Matthews Sesoko, the Director of Investigations
for IPID, stated, “I don’t think they [police] are trained to be violent in
police college, the problem is when they get to the precinct and who
their mentors were.” 130 Sesoko emphasized this culture is not new,
stating the “problem is you have a culture of a police force from the
apartheid era where it was a normal thing to be brutal to citizens. There
was always impunity.” 131 Thus, a culture of impunity has historical
roots in both the United States and South Africa.
Additionally, in both countries, the culture of policing is deeply
rooted in police officers’ identity as police officers. In the United
States, according to Chicago Mayor Rahm Emanuel, this creates a
problem known as the “thin blue line” or the “code of silence.” 132 This
policing culture can be so deeply ingrained that even head police
officers and the departments’ internal affairs units can become
compromised. 133 Significantly, these are the very officers who are
charged with investigating police misconduct and violence. 134
Similarly, in South Africa, Robert McBride says that for police officers,
“regardless of color, blood stays blue.” 135 Additionally, McBride stated
that the code of silence in South Africa amongst police officers creates
a “blue curtain, behind which you are not allowed to see.” 136
Both the United States and South Africa’s policing cultures are
related to the large percentage of men in the police force. As of 2013,
129.
Rich Morin et al., Behind the Badge: Inside America’s Police
SOC.
TRENDS
(Jan.
11,
2017),
Departments,
PEW
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2017/01/11/inside-americas-police-departments/.
130. Sesoko Interview, supra note 89.
131. Id.
132. Jamie Kalven, Code of Silence: Part 1, THE INTERCEPT (Oct. 6, 2016, 6:00
AM), https://theintercept.com/2016/10/06/in-the-chicago-police-department-if-thebosses-say-it-didnt-happen-it-didnt-happen/. Shannon Spalding, a former Chicago
police officer, was financial destroyed and stripped of her job for failing to abide by
the “code of silence” or “thin blue line.” In an interview, Spalding called this behavior
“‘Operation Smoke and Mirrors . . . If four bosses in the department say it didn’t
happen, it didn’t happen.’” Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. McBride Interview, supra note 42.
136. Id.
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women accounted for just 12% of local, full-time police officers in the
United States. 137 In South Africa, women accounted for 32.5% of
commissioned officers in the 2015-2016 annual report. 138 However,
only 18% of officers patrolling the street were women. 139 In the United
States, analysis shows “hyper masculinity of the rank and file is
encouraged, reinforced and policed in numerous ways.” 140
One report found the level of an officer’s insecurity with his own
masculinity (also known as masculinity threat) predicted whether the
officer had used force against Black men in the last two years. 141 South
African police officers, like their American counterparts, also have a
culture of masculinity. 142 Antony Altbeker, a researcher who
conducted an ethnographic study of police officers noted, “It’s quite
explicit. It’s all for the women’s safety, obviously, is the way they see
it. Nevertheless, it’s constant in the way they police gender roles.”143
Therefore, South Africa and the United States’ policing share similar
barriers in the form of racial bias and patriarchal attitudes that
undermine changes in policing post-apartheid.
B. Patterns of Behavior and Continued Tools
In the United States and South Africa, the continuation in policing
behavior suggests that institutional biases create differences in lived
experiences for citizens, even if the laws provide equal protection under
137. Brian A. Reaves, Local Police Departments, 2013: Personnel, Policies,
and Practices, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 4 (2015).
138. Dep’t of Police, SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE SERVICE: ANNUAL REPORT
2015/16
34
(2016),
https://www.saps.gov.za/about/stratframework/
annual_report/2015_2016/saps_annual_report_2015_2016.pdf.
139. Interview with David Bruce, Independent Researcher, in Johannesburg, S.
Afr. (Jan. 6, 2017) [hereinafter Bruce Interview].
140. L. Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba Goff, Interrogating Racial Violence,
12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 115, 131 (2014).
141. Id. at 136.
142. McBride Interview, supra note 42.
143. Altbeker Interview, supra note 108. An ethnographic study generally
“refers to a social science research that [] explores ‘the nature of particular social
phenomena, rather than setting out to test hypotheses about them . . . .’” Davis S.
Caudill, Law, Science and Science Studies: Contrasting the Deposition of a Scientific
Expert With Ethnographic Studies of Scientific Practice, 12 S. CAL. INTERDIS. L.J. 85,
85 (2002).
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the law. The racial biases and presumptions regarding who is presumed
a criminal seem to remain in both countries. Furthermore, in both
countries, the way police officers conceive their role and the tools that
are used to effectuate their roles do not appear to have significantly
changed since segregation or apartheid.
In the United States, neither explicit racism nor implicit racial bias
was associated with greater use of force by police officers. 144 A
masculinity report conducted in the United States hypothesized racial
stereotypes about Black men as “violent, criminal, dangerous, and
animal-like” construct Black men as more masculine in relation to other
men, and that this masculinity threat causes police officers to use
greater force. 145 Finding masculinity threats as the cause for greater use
of force, rather than racism, helps explain why increasing
representation of Black police officers does not reduce the use of force
by officers in a police department. 146
In South Africa, 63% of commissioned officers are Black African
and 24% are White. 147 Still, Antony Altbeker, the ethnographic
researcher described above, stated, “I’m pretty sure they [Black
officers] have internalized all the profiling. I don’t think there’s too
much of a difference between White cops and Black cops between
who’s a criminal and who’s not. I think that those sets of ideas and
prejudices are common throughout the police.” 148 According to Dr.
Fazel Randera, who served on the South African Truth and
Reconciliation Commission, these biases are not new, stating that prior
to the end of apartheid in 1994, the “propaganda was Black people were
savages.” 149
The way police officers conceptualize their roles in both countries
also reflects that change has been limited since the days when police
officers were enforcing racial separation. In the United States, 31% of
144. Richardson & Goff, supra note 140, at 136.
145. Id. at 136–37.
146. See generally Sean Nicholson-Crotty, Jill Nicholson-Crotty & Sergio
Fernandez, Will More Black Cops Matter? Officer Race and Police-Involved
Homicides of Black Citizens, 77 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 206 (2017).
147. Altbeker Interview, supra note 108.
148. Id.
149. Interview with Dr. Fazel Randera, Fmr. Comm., The Indep. S. Afr. Truth
and Reconciliation Comm’n, in Johannesburg, S. Afr. (Jan. 11, 2017) [hereinafter
Randera Interview].
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officers say they view themselves as protectors, 8% as enforcers and
62% view themselves as protectors and enforcers equally. 150 Similarly,
in South Africa, Altbeker says, “What really changed after apartheid
was who’s in power, but what was supposed to change was that police
were supposed to see themselves as not protecting the state, but
providing services to citizens.” 151
In the United States, academia has drawn clear lines from slave
catchers to policing during segregation to police violence in the present
day. 152 Additionally, the United States’ history of racial discrimination
has been explored in popular culture through films and books. 153 In
South Africa, both the media and elders in communities have drawn the
connection between apartheid-era policing practices and current
misconduct. 154 One organizer, Bongani Xezwi, said the police use the
“same tactics of intimidation as [the] apartheid government.” 155 Based
on Xezwi’s interactions with the police, he believes “most of the
policies that were supposed to change after apartheid didn’t change.” 156
Willie Hofmeyr opined that there was a post-apartheid effort to try to
make the police force more of a civilian force; however, in the face of
growing crime, “some of the militarization [of the police] is
justifiable.” 157 Journalist Mpikeleni Duma referred to the efforts to
demilitarize the police as “cosmetic rethinking.” 158
Ultimately, police officers in neither country are able to selfregulate nor hold themselves accountable because there is a policing
culture and system that allows police officers to hide under a shield of
impunity.

150. Rich Morin et al., Behind the Badge, PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 11, 2017),
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2017/01/11/behind-the-badge/.
151. Altbeker, supra note 108.
152. See Gloria J. Browne-Marshall, Stop and Frisk: From Slave-Catchers to
NYPD, A Legal Commentary, 21 TROTTER R. 98 (2013).
153. See generally ALEXANDER, supra note 101; see also THE 13TH (Netflix
2016).
154. Segodi Interview, supra note 38.
155. Xezwi Interview, supra note 57.
156. Id.
157. Hofmeyr Interview, supra note 6.
158. Duma Interview, supra note 54.
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V. LESSONS ON HOW TO IMPROVE ACCOUNTABILITY FOR
POLICE VIOLENCE
In comparing the structures and functional practices that strengthen
and limit accountability in the United States and South Africa, one may
glean lessons on how to improve these systems that are obfuscated
when only looking at one system. First, it is necessary to exercise
caution in presuming solutions can be derived from measurable
disparities between the two countries. Intersectional analysis suggests
the racial composition of a police department does not change incidents
of unjustified use of force; however, gender composition may. This
supports the hypothesis that the cause of racial disparities in use of force
cases may relate more to perceptions of a masculinity threat—often
related to race—rather than implicit or explicit racial bias. 159 Thus, an
effort to correct racial biases in police departments would not
necessarily solve the issues of use of force.
Second, the comparative analysis illustrates the United States can
do much more to improve the structural process of investigating and
prosecuting police violence, and the current challenges are not inherent
or forgone conclusions. On the other hand, South Africa’s challenges
demonstrates that changing formal institutions will only fix some of the
issues, and there is a need to actively work on changing the culture of
the institutions. As Matthews Sesoko points out, corruption for the
purposes of monetary gain does not necessitate violence on the part of
police. 160 Therefore, misconduct in South Africa is more attributable
to culture than issues of corruption. 161 Whereas the United States
places a significant emphasis on policing culture without considering
institutional responsibility for holding police accountable, and whether
the appropriate institutions are empowered and capable to successfully
investigate police.
Finally, the public must be empowered to hold the government
accountable to have consistent limits on state violence. This can be
done through structures that improve voice, representation, and
influence as well as cultural changes that help improve individuals’
belief in their own agency and ability to exert influence. The structural
159.
160.
161.

Richardson & Goff, supra note 140.
Sesoko Interview, supra note 89.
Id.
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robustness of the South African prosecution system demonstrates that
the United States needs to address its institutional shortcomings to
improve its processes for police accountability. However, some of the
functional neutering of South African prosecutors’ efficacy
demonstrates a need to examine systems of accountability to identify
and correct breakdowns in those systems.
In both countries, little, if any, attention is paid to complicit
prosecutors who perpetuate institutional racism by failing to hold police
officers accountable. Given that prosecutors were responsible for
enforcing many of the segregation-era and apartheid-era laws, they
provide an instructive case study for how institutional racism
perpetuates after the formal dismantling of legal structures of racial
separation. The case study outlined in this paper demonstrates that
complicity in perpetuating institutionalized injustices and inequities is
not necessarily a problem of individuals with bad intentions. Rather it
is a problem of structures, systems, and cultures that create barriers to
accountability. Due to path dependency, efforts must be taken in a
proactive manner to change these structures, systems and cultures.
A. History
First, a shared national history is important to understand the
historical narratives that influence some citizens. In the United States,
efforts to document the history of slavery and racial violence are
relatively recent. 162 As a result, in the last fifty years after the end of
segregation, and over the last 200 years since the end of slavery, counter
narratives have developed around both of those systems of oppression.
Part of the challenge is that the Confederacy continues to be celebrated
publicly in parts of the United States. 163 On the other hand, the more
painful parts of American history are just now becoming public through

162. See, e.g., Universities Studying Slavery, PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON
SLAVERY AND THE UNIVERSITY, http://slavery.virginia.edu/universities-studyingslavery/; Lynching in America: Confronting the Legacy of Racial Terror, EQUAL JUST.
INITIATIVE (2015), http://eji.org/sites/default/files/lynching-in-america-secondedition-summary.pdf/.
163. See Joe Sterling, A New Alabama Law Makes Sure Confederate
Monuments are Here to Stay, CNN (May 26, 2017, 5:19 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2017/05/26/us/alabama-confederate-monuments-bill-trnd/.
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the National Museum of African American History and Culture and
Equal Justice Initiative’s lynching memorial. 164
By contrast, South Africa rapidly attempted to contend with its
complicated history through museums such as the Apartheid
Museum 165 and historical sites such as Liliesleaf Farm. 166 This may be
attributed to the differences in the demographics of the two countries or
it may reflect a greater willingness to deal with past challenges in the
absence of a narrative around exceptionalism that is embedded into the
American psyche. 167
B. “Rehumanization”
After a political system systematically dehumanizes people based
on socially constructed characteristics, the country must undergo a
national process of “rehumanization” to heal. In the United States, the
government has only recently begun to apologize for its past
misconduct. Indeed, the International Association of Chiefs of Police
(IACP) apologized for its past role in racially discriminatory policing,
and the U.S. House of Representatives apologized for the United States’
history of slavery. 168 Additionally, the Department of Justice has

164. See Vinson Cunningham, Making a Home for Black History, THE NEW
YORKER (Aug. 29, 2016), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/08/29/
analyzing-the-national-museum-of-african-american-history-and-culture; Jonathan
Capehart, What the Lynching Memorial Will Force Us All to Face, WASH. POST (Dec.
21,
2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/postpartisan/wp/2016/12/21/what-the-lynching-memorial-will-force-us-all-toface/?utm_term=.aa65bf96557c.
MUSEUM,
About
the
Museum,
165. APARTHEID
https://www.apartheidmuseum.org/about-museum-0 (last visited Jan. 14, 2018).
166. SOUTH AFR. EXPLORED, The Liliesleaf Farm, https://www.savenues.com/attractionsga/liliesleaf-farm.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2018).
167. “‘Faith in their own [American] exceptionalism has sometimes led to a
certain obtuseness on the part of Americans, a tendency to preach at other nations
rather than listen to them, a tendency as well to assume that American motives are
pure where those of others are not . . .’” Harold Hongju Koh, On American
Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1479, 1480 (2003).
168. Tom Jackman, U.S. Police Chiefs Group Apologizes for ‘Historical
POST
(Oct.
17,
2016),
Mistreatment’
of
Minorities,
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/true-crime/wp/2016/10/17/head-of-u-spolice-chiefs-apologizes-for-historic-mistreatment-of-minorities/?utm_term=.
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funded a Trust and Justice initiative to attempt to facilitate
conversations in the spirit of reconciliation at the local level. 169
However, these conversations are taking place decades, if not centuries,
after the initial violations occurred. Therefore, the process of healing
is more difficult because dehumanizing narratives have passed down
through generations without government acknowledgment of these
atrocities. Now, those attempting to undergo this healing in the United
States do not necessarily have the memory of overt injustices their
ancestors participated in or were complicit in allowing to occur.
However, in South Africa, there was a Truth and Reconciliation
Commission (“TRC”). 170 Robert McBride, who received amnesty from
the TRC said, “When you have the opportunity to speak to people who
you have caused harm it rehumanizes you to yourself.” 171 He clarified
that it serves to ameliorate the “psychic numbing where you are solely
focused on your political mission.” 172 Further, Fazel Randera, who was
a commissioner of the TRC, noted, “[O]ne doesn’t get the sense that
any White person feels that they were complicit in apartheid,” and,
consequently, they “don’t understand the advantages they got that
continue to give them advantages in the new South Africa.” 173
One reason for this may be that while some institutional
examination was done, its focus had a limited scope. Antony Altbeker
says that because the TRC’s focus was on political policing and not dayto-day policing, a majority of police officers think the TRC was
irrelevant to the work they were involved in. 174 Altbeker believes,
“[T]he gross human rights violations focus of [the] TRC missed the
whole point of apartheid. Because, measured on those terms, it wasn’t
particularly oppressive. The point of apartheid was the systemic
indignity, oppressive, and resource sapping that was part of it.” 175 In
3d428df1f12d; House Apologizes for Slavery, ‘Jim Crow’ Injustices, CNN (July 29,
2008, 7:11 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/07/29/house.slavery/.
169. Reconciliation, NATIONAL INITIATIVE FOR BUILDING COMMUNITY TRUST
AND JUSTICE, https://trustandjustice.org/resources/intervention/reconciliation (last
visited Jan. 14, 2018).
170. Promotion of National United and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995 (S. Afr.).
171. McBride Interview, supra note 42.
172. Id.
173. Randera Interview, supra note 149.
174. Altbeker Interview, supra note 108.
175. Id.
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this way, while a process like the TRC may provide rehumanization for
individuals, more is needed to change institutions and acknowledge
complicity.
C. Trainings on Institutional Roles in Past Injustices
A national shared history and rehumanizing process is insufficient
to combat the path dependency of institutions without specific trainings
within institutions that allow new members to understand what past
injustices the institution has committed. This education allows newer
individuals to understand public reactions to the institution and builds
a culture of vigilance in ensuring similar injustices never occur again.
Neither country has pursued a national effort to incentivize
trainings for all prosecutors’ offices to understand and acknowledge the
roles their institutions had in perpetuating unjust laws nor their
complicity in allowing crimes of racial terror to go unpunished. In
South Africa, the lack of historical trainings has allowed for a counternarrative to develop within the policing subculture about police
officers’ role in apartheid. 176 Therefore, many ignore their role in
perpetuating apartheid and believe they were instrumental in providing
the order to transition South Africa to democracy. 177 It is important for
institutions, whose members were actively or complicity involved in
perpetuating injustices in the past, to teach new members about the
institution’s history so they can appreciate and cautiously hold the
power they currently yield.
D. Reexamination of Tools Institutions Use
If institutions have new mandates, such as the way prosecutors’
offices are now required to ensure an equal application of the law, it
drastically shifts their roles from enforcers to protectors. As such, it is
important to reexamine the tools those institutions are using to
effectuate those goals. In the United States, this has not occurred in a
public manner around prosecution though there have been efforts to
reimagine who can fulfill that role. For example, in a recent election, a

176.
177.

Id.
Id.
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civil rights lawyer won a prosecutorial election. 178 There was also
thoughtful examination around the culture of policing at the national
level in the United States through the President’s Task Force on 21st
Century Policing. 179
In post-apartheid South Africa, people believed the problem of bad
actors was endemic in the police, and there was less concern about
prosecutors’ behavior under apartheid. 180 Still, during the transition
period from apartheid to democracy, prosecutors played a key role in
investigating rogue elements of the armed services and had the
opportunity to reexamine their role as enforcers and shift to a protector
model. 181 A reevaluation of the tools police officers use was
contemplated during the negotiations prior to a new constitution, but
was left incomplete. 182 As a result, police officers today are widely
criticized for their inability to effectively conduct public service or
public order policing. 183
E. Institutions Need to Commit Themselves to Data Collection
and Transparency
To illuminate and hold institutions accountable for their actions,
institutions need to commit to data collection and transparency of that
data. In the United States, with a system of decentralized prosecutions,
there are only a few offices that are beginning to share data. For
example, in Cleveland, Ohio, the prosecutor’s office publicly shares
data on prosecution disaggregated by race. 184
Moreover, in
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, the District Attorney’s office announced
178. Julia Terruso, DA Primary Winner Larry Krasner: I’m not beholden to
(May
17,
2017,
12:24
PM),
Soros,
PHILLY.COM
http://www.philly.com/philly/news/politics/city/Larry-Krasner-District-AttorneyDemocratic-primary-winner-Soros.html.
179. Final Report of the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, THE
PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING (May 2015),
https://cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/taskforce_finalreport.pdf.
180. Hofmeyr, supra note 6.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Friedman Interview, supra note 27.
184. Benchmarks and Data, CUYAHOGA COUNTY OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR,
http://prosecutor.cuyahogacounty.us/en-US/benchmarks-data.aspx (last visited May
2017).
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transparent use-of-force protocol. 185 In South Africa, some of these
transparency measures are embedded within the structures through
reporting requirements. 186 However, there are flaws in ensuring
robustness of data collection and ensuring there are adequate resources
and information provided to the public so they can serve as a check on
data collection and transparency. 187
F. Government Needs to Encourage Civic Participation
All of the information provided to the public is not actionable
because as discussed supra, individuals in both countries have limited
ability to participate in the political process. 188
Accordingly,
governments must actively work to combat political inequality so that
all citizens can have voice, representation, and influence. In the United
States, this is largely about improving processes that confer more
political power on some individuals over others. In South Africa, this
is also a concern; but there is a broader concern that as a young
democracy, many people still do not know their individual due process
In both countries, the
rights under the new Constitution. 189
governments can close information gaps through outreach efforts and
the creation of forums that actively solicit feedback from citizens to
ensure they feel heard and the government is responsive to their
concerns.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, both the United States and South Africa struggle
with political inequality that continues to create barriers for the will of
the people to be enacted in government. Furthermore, both countries
have structural issues in prosecutions of police violence that limit its
effectiveness as a tool for accountability. These issues are exacerbated
185. Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office, Philadelphia District Attorney
Announces Transparent, Progressive Officer Involved Shooting Protocol (Nov. 10,
2016),
https://phillyda.wordpress.com/2016/11/10/philadelphia-district-attorneyannounces-transparent-progressive-officer-involved-shooting-protocol/.
186. Bruce Interview, supra note 139.
187. McBride Interview, supra note 42.
188. See Discussion Part I.
189. Randera Interview, supra note 149.
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by cultural and systemic issues surrounding prosecutions of police
violence. Similarly, civil lawsuits as a tool of accountability have
limitations. Finally, an ongoing culture of impunity within policing
makes internal self-regulation a challenge as a tool of accountability.
Still, given the countries’ shared history of racial separation, a
comparative analysis of these countries is instructive in providing
lessons for how both countries can improve their systems of
accountability around police violence. Finally, using the complicity of
prosecutors and other challenges of policing accountability, a
framework for undoing institutionalized injustices can be proposed with
the hope of limiting future societal harms by institutions created to serve
the public.
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